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Abstract 
According to the hybrid theory of object recognition (Hummel, 2001), ignored object images 
are represented holistically, and attended images both holistically and analytically. This 
account correctly predicts patterns of visual priming as a function of translation, scale 
(Stankiewicz & Hummel, 2000) and left-right reflection (Stankiewicz, Hummel & Cooper, 
1998). The model also predicts that priming for attended images will generalize over 
configural distortions (split images) whereas priming for ignored images will not.  Three 
experiments tested and confirmed this prediction. Split images visually primed their intact 
and split counterparts when they were attended but not when they were ignored, whereas 
intact images primed themselves whether they were attended or not. The data contribute to 
the growing body of evidence that one function of visual attention is to permit the generation 
of explicitly relational representations of object shape.  
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Evidence for Holistic Representations of Ignored Images and 
Analytic Representations of Attended Images 
 
 
         The human capacity for visual object recognition is characterized by a number of 
properties that are jointly very challenging to explain. Among the most notable is that the 
visual representation of shape is invariant with (i.e., insensitive to) the location of the image 
in the visual field (Biederman & Cooper, 1991), the size of the image (Biederman & Cooper, 
1992), left-right (i.e., mirror) reflection (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Davidoff & 
Warrington, 2001), and some rotations in depth (Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993, 1995; but 
see Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995). Object recognition is also remarkably robust to variations in 
shape (Davidoff & Warrington, 1999). For example, a child's drawing of a car may be easily 
recognizable as a car, even if it neither resembles any particular real car, nor resembles any 
road-worthy object. At the same time, object recognition is sensitive to rotations about the 
line of sight (Jolicoeur, 1985; Tarr & Pinker, 1989, 1990) and some rotations in depth (see 
Lawson, 1999, for a review). 
         The combination of view-invariant and view-dependent properties of object recognition 
is problematic for theories that rely exclusively on the geometric properties of object shape -
for example by matching two-dimensional (2-D) images to 3-D models in memory (e.g., 
Lowe, 1987; Ullman, 1989, 1996) or by using mathematical interpolation to determine 
whether a given image is a "legal" projection of a familiar shape (e.g., Poggio & Edelman, 
1990; Ullman & Basri, 1991). A visual system that relied exclusively on the laws of 
projective geometry would be equally able to accommodate all variations in viewpoint 
(which the human visual system does not) but would not tolerate variations in object shape 
(which the human visual system does).  Such a visual system would also fail to treat an image 
and its left-right reflection as equivalent. 
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         In the attempt to better explain the properties of human object recognition, a number of 
researchers have proposed that objects are visually represented as structural descriptions 
specifying the object's features or parts in terms of their (typically categorical) inter-relations 
(Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996b, 1998; 
Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Palmer, 1977; Winston, 1975). For example (see Biederman, 1987), 
a coffee mug might be represented as a curved cylinder (the handle) side-attached to a 
straight vertical cylinder (the body). Like human shape perception, this description is 
unaffected by translation across the visual field, changes in size, left-right reflection and 
some rotations in depth.  However, it is sensitive to rotations about the line of sight (e.g., a 
90° rotation changes the side-attached relation between the cup handle and body to an above-
attached relation). The description also applies to many different mugs, permitting 
generalization over metric variations in the shapes of a class of objects.  
One of the most important properties of a structural description is that it is an analytic 
representation, meaning that it specifies the relations among an object's parts both explicitly 
and independently of the parts (Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel, 2000). For example, 
the spatial relation between the body and the handle of a coffee mug is explicitly described as 
“side-attached”; this spatial relation is independent of the parts it describes and may be used 
in conjunction with other parts to describe a different object. In contrast, a holistic 
representation such as a 3-D model (e.g., Lowe, 1987; Ullman, 1989, 1996) a 2-D “view” 
(e.g., Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995) or an 
object “fragment” (Edelman & Intrator, 2000, 2003) does not represent the relations among 
an object’s parts explicitly or independently of those parts.  Instead, an object’s features or 
parts are represented in terms of their literal positions in a 2-D (in the case of view- and 
fragment-based models) or 3-D (in the case of model-based models) coordinate system (see 
Hummel, 2000; 2003a, for reviews).   
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Consistent with the structural description account of shape perception, there is 
evidence that the visual system represents the relations among an object’s parts both 
explicitly (Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996b; Palmer, 1978; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984) and 
independently of the parts themselves (Saiki & Hummel, 1998). However, two properties of 
object perception are inconsistent with the properties of analytic representations.  First, 
despite the substantial evidence that feature conjunctions require time-consuming attentional 
resources (Logan, 1994; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Treisman & Gelade, 1980), there is evidence 
that object recognition does not require visual attention.  For example, numerous studies have 
demonstrated either negative priming (e.g., Murray, 1995; Tipper, 1985; Treisman & 
DeSchepper, 1996) or positive priming for ignored object images (Stankiewicz, et al., 1998; 
Stankiewicz & Hummel, 2002). Whether the observed priming is positive or negative 
depends on whether the probe task requires the observer to actively ignore an irrelevant 
image. Second, both behavioral evidence (e.g., Intraub, 1981) and evidence from single-unit 
recording (e.g., Oram & Perrett, 1992) indicate that object recognition is too fast to depend 
on analytic representations alone.  Together, the speed and automaticity of object recognition 
suggest that structural descriptions cannot be the only basis for entry-level common object 
recognition (for a review, see Hummel, 2001). 
In order to account for the speed and automaticity of common object recognition, 
while at the same time accounting for those properties of object recognition that are 
consistent with the role of structural descriptions, Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996a; 
Hummel, 2001) proposed a hybrid model of object recognition.  The key idea behind the 
model is that holistic representations of shape can be generated rapidly and automatically 
because they do not represent object features or parts independently of their relations and as a 
result, they do not require dynamic binding of parts to their relations.  According to this 
model, attending to an object’s image activates (and therefore visually primes) both a 
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structural description of the object’s shape and a holistic (i.e., view-like) representation of its 
shape; ignoring an image activates the holistic representation of its shape but not the 
structural description.  The resulting model accounts for a large number of phenomena in 
human shape perception and object recognition (including all those cited above) and also 
generates several novel predictions (see Hummel, 2001).  
One set of novel predictions concerns the relationship between visual attention and 
patterns of visual priming across left-right (i.e., mirror) reflections.  The structural 
descriptions generated by the Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996a; Hummel, 2001) model are 
invariant with left-right reflection (i.e., the structural description the model generates in 
response to one image is identical to the structural description it generates in response to its 
left-right reflection; the same is true of the models of Hummel & Biederman, 1992, and 
Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1998).  However, the model’s holistic representations are sensitive 
to left-right reflection (i.e., an image and its reflection may generate non-overlapping holistic 
representations).  As such, the model predicts that attending to an object image will activate 
(and visually prime) both that image and its left-right reflection, whereas ignoring the image 
will activate and prime that image, but not its reflection.   
Stankiewicz et al. (1998) tested and confirmed the predictions of the hybrid 
analytic/holistic model in an object naming task with paired prime/probe trials.  A prime trial 
consisted of a fixation cross followed by a cueing box to the left or right of fixation, followed 
by two line drawings of common objects, one of which appeared inside the cueing box, and 
the other appeared on the other side of fixation.  The participant's task was to name the cued 
image (the attended prime); they were not required to respond to the other (the ignored 
prime). Each prime display was followed by a probe display containing a single image at 
fixation. The task was to name the object.  The probe image depicted either the same object 
as the attended prime, the same object as the ignored prime, or an object the participant had 
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not previously seen in the experiment (an unprimed probe, which served as a baseline). Probe 
images (except for unprimed probes) were either identical to the corresponding primes, or 
were left-right reflections of them. Attended prime images reliably primed both themselves 
and their left-right reflections.  However, ignored prime images only primed themselves.  
Moreover, the effects of attention (attended vs. ignored) and reflection (identical images vs. 
left-right reflections) were strictly additive: The priming advantage for same view prime-
probe trials was equivalent in both attended and unattended conditions (about 50 ms).  The 
fact that attention and reflection had additive effects on priming provides strong support for 
the independence of the holistic and structured representations of shape in the hybrid model. 
A second prediction of the Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996a; Hummel, 2001) hybrid 
model derives from the fact that the holistic representation, although sensitive to left-right 
reflection, is invariant with translation and scale.  That is, even the representation generated 
on the holistic representation is independent of the object's location or size.  The hybrid 
model predicts that priming for both attended and ignored images should be invariant with 
translation and scale. Stankiewicz and Hummel (2002) tested and confirmed this prediction.  
Although priming for attended images is globally greater than priming for ignored images, 
priming for both attended and ignored images is invariant with both translation and scale. 
Although the findings of Stankiewicz and colleagues are clearly consistent with the 
hybrid model, they do not provide direct support for the model’s primary theoretical 
assertion, which is that object shape is represented in a hybrid analytic+holistic fashion.  It is 
possible, for example, that both attended and ignored images are represented in a strictly 
holistic fashion, but that attention permits the visual system to “flip” the representation of an 
image, permitting recognition (and priming) that is invariant over mirror reflections. 
Therefore in the present studies we exploited the fact that analytic representations of shape 
are necessarily more robust to configural distortions (such as splitting an image down the 
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middle and moving the left half of the image to the right-hand side; see Figure 1) than are 
holistic representations; this point bears elaborating.   
Holistic representations are matched “all of a piece”.  For example, a holistic 
representation of the intact horse in Figure 1 (e.g., a view of the horse in a typical view-based 
model; e.g., Edelman, 1998; Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Ullman & Basri, 1991) would be 
matched, in its entirety, against an object’s image to determine the degree of fit between the 
image and the holistic representation (i.e., view) in memory: The coordinates of the features 
in the viewed image would be matched to the coordinates of the features in the stored view 
and the degree of fit would be computed as a function of the vector similarity of the 
coordinates of corresponding features.  The process is directly analogous to laying a template 
for the intact horse over the image of the split horse and counting the points of overlap. By 
this holistic measure of similarity, the intact and split horse images are utterly different 
because no corresponding (and few if any similar) features reside in equivalent locations in 
the two images.   
By contrast, to an analytic representation of shape, the intact and split images of the 
horse, while by no means identical, are nonetheless highly similar because they depict many 
of the same parts in many of the same spatial relations: Both depict a torso-like shape 
connected in various relations to leg- and head-like shapes. It is unimportant that the image-
splitting procedure does not result in a “natural” parsing of the object into its parts. Splitting 
an image down the middle is very unlikely to parse it into pieces that correspond to part-
boundaries but this is unproblematic for structural description theories as long as the shapes 
of the object’s parts (such as the halves of the horse’s torso in Figure 1) are recoverable from 
the information presented in each half of the image (Biederman, 1987; Hummel & 
Biederman, 1992).  And most if not all of the time, the parts’ shapes will be recoverable (e.g., 
note that the horse is recognizable from either the front half or the left half alone). Recovery 
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is easy because it is the relations between connected parts that are much more important to 
shape perception than relations between separated parts (Saiki & Hummel, 1996, 1998a, 
1998b). In the split image, the front of the horse is not connected to the back of the horse, so 
the resulting incorrect spatial relations between, say, the horse’s head and its hind legs have 
little perceptual effect. Indeed, Cave and Kosslyn (1993) showed that split stimuli are 
substantially easier to recognise after short presentation times than scrambled objects that 
disturb the spatial relationships between parts.  
 Some recent view-based models (notably Edelman & Intrator, 2000; 2003) are based, 
not on templates for whole objects, but rather templates for object “fragments” - subsets of 
complete objects (e.g., the upper half of an object; see Edelman & Intrator, 2003).  Such 
models appear, at first blush, to be able to appreciate the similarity between a split image and 
its intact counterpart: A split image would seem to activate the same fragments as an intact 
version of the same image, thereby permitting visual priming from one to the other.  
However, even this fragment-based version of view-based theory predicts that a split image 
will not prime its intact counterpart.  The reason is that the “fragments” these models use to 
represent object shape are tied to specific locations in the visual field (a representational 
scheme dubbed “what+where” coding; see Edelman & Intrator, 2000, 2003).  As a result, an 
intact object image will activate one set of fragments (e.g., a fragment for the front of a left-
facing horse in the left part of the visual field, and a fragment for the back half of the same 
horse in the right half of the visual field), and a split version of the same image will activate a 
completely separate set of fragments (a fragment for the front half of a left-facing horse in the 
right half of the visual field and a fragment for the back half of that horse in the left half of 
the visual field).  Because the two sets of fragments are non-overlapping, the model predicts 
no priming from one to the other (see Hummel, 2003b).  
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 At the other extreme, Mel and colleagues (e.g., Mel, 1997; Mel & Fiser, 2000) 
propose that the visual system recognizes objects simply by matching lists of location-
invariant features to object memory.  Such models are sensitive to which features are present 
in an object’s image, but are completely indifferent to the locations of those features (either 
relative to one another, or in the image as a whole).  These models predict that a split image 
will prime its intact counterpart (because the two depict many of the same features), but that 
this effect will obtain whether the split image is attended or not. 
 The general point is that without the ability to represent an object's parts 
independently of their locations, a model cannot predict priming from a split image to its 
intact counterpart.  And without the ability to represent spatial relations explicitly (e.g., to 
represent which part is connected to which, located where relative to which, etc.), a model 
cannot separate an object's parts from their locations without losing the ability to represent 
how the parts are arranged.  In other words, models based exclusively on holistic 
representations of shape -- i.e., conjunctions of shapes in particular locations -- cannot, in 
principle, predict that a split image could visually prime its intact counterpart.  Only an 
analytic representation, such as a structural description, in which an object's parts are 
represented independently of their locations (and relations), or a feature list (e.g., Mel, 1997) 
can predict that a split image will visually prime its intact counterpart.  And of these, only the 
hybrid model of Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996a; Hummel, 2001), predicts that the priming 
from a split image to its intact counterpart will be moderated by visual attention. 
{Figure 1 about here} 
              The present paper reports three experiments designed to directly test the central 
theoretical assertion of the hybrid model, investigating whether the representation of an 
attended image is analytic, and the representation of an ignored image is holistic.  Experiment 
1 investigated the role of attention in priming for split and intact object images.  Participants 
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named objects in pairs of prime-probe trials (as in Stankiewicz, et al, 1998, and Stankiewicz 
& Hummel, 2002).  The first trial in a pair served as the prime, and presented two object 
images, one of which (the attended image) was spatially pre-cued.  The participant’s task was 
to name the pre-cued object, ignoring the other (the ignored image).  Half of the prime 
images were presented intact, and half were split either horizontally or vertically, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.  The factors of attention (attended vs. ignored image) and image type 
(intact vs. split) were crossed orthogonally.  The probe image was always intact, and 
corresponded either to the attended prime, the ignored prime, or an image the observer had 
not previously seen in the experiment (which served as a baseline). The hybrid 
holistic/analytic model predicts that intact images will prime themselves whether they are 
attended or not (although priming should be greater for attended than ignored images); split 
images should prime their intact counterparts when they are attended, but not when they are 
ignored.   
 Experiment 2 served to estimate what fraction of the priming observed in Experiment 
1 was specifically visual (as opposed to name or concept priming).  Experiment 3 tested 
whether priming for ignored images in Experiment 1 could be attributed to low-level visual 
representations (e.g., of the local features in an object’s image) rather than holistic 
representations in long-term memory.  On the former (low-level priming) account, ignored 
split images should prime themselves as much as ignored intact images prime themselves. On 
the latter (hybrid model) account, only ignored intact images should prime themselves. 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-two native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated for credit in introductory psychology courses at the University of California, Los 
Angeles.  
Materials 
 Black-and-white line drawings of 84 asymmetrical objects from the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart (1980) set were displayed on a PC monitor. Response times were collected using 
E-Prime 1.0 (PST) with a dynamic trigger microphone attached to an Interface Box. 
Participants sat approximately 90 cm from the display. The images were standardized in size 
to subtend 4.0° of visual angle. For each object, a ”split” version was created by using a 50% 
“offset” filter in Adobe Photoshop 5.5, resulting in images that appeared to be cut in two 
halves that were relocated to the opposite side of the canvas (vertically or horizontally). The 
manipulation did not alter the total number of pixels in an image, or the number or local 
configuration of any image features, except that some lines were necessarily broken at the 
location of the cut  (see Figure 1). 
Procedure 
 The experimental conditions in which objects appeared were counterbalanced across 
participants by placing each image into one of 14 clusters, each containing six images, for the 
seven different prime-probe conditions.  These conditions were: attended-intact, attended-
split, attended-not probed, ignored-intact, ignored-split, ignored-not probed, and unprimed. 
All primes preceded an intact probe image, all images appeared in all seven conditions 
equally often across participants. 
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 An image appeared in only one trial pair for any given participant. The ordering of the 
36 trials and the pairing of attended and ignored objects on prime trials were randomized for 
each participant. The participants read instructions, which they then paraphrased back to the 
experimenter. The experimental session began with 18 practice trials using a set of images 
different from the experimental set. After the practice trials, the participants were asked 
whether they had any questions. 
 The sequence of events in a trial is depicted in Figure 2. An unfilled circle in the 
center of the screen remained until the participant started the trial by pressing the space bar. 
The circle was then replaced with a fixation cross, which remained on the screen for 495 ms, 
followed by a blank white screen for 30 ms. An attentional cueing square 4.5° of visual angle 
on a side was then presented either to the left or right of the fixation cross, centered 4.0° from 
fixation. After 75 ms, two object images were displayed simultaneously for 120 ms, with the 
attended image inside the square, and the unattended image centered 4.0° from fixation on the 
other side of the screen. The prime images could be both intact, both split or one of each. 
After the images disappeared, a blank screen was shown for 30 ms, followed by a random-
line pattern mask that covered the entire screen (15.6° of visual angle) for 495 ms. The entire 
prime display lasted less than 200 ms, a duration too short to permit a saccade to the cueing 
square or either object. The participant’s task at prime was to say the name of the cued 
(attended) object as quickly and as accurately as possible.  
{Figure 2 about here} 
 After the prime display, a blank screen was displayed for 1,995 ms, followed by a 
fixation cross (495 ms). Following a 30 ms blank screen, the probe image was displayed in 
the center of the screen for 150 ms. The probe depicted either the attended object (attended 
conditions), the ignored object (ignored conditions), or an object the participant had not seen 
previously in the experiment (unprimed baseline condition). The probe image was always 
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intact. In total, 3,015 ms elapsed between the end of the prime display and the beginning of 
the probe display. The probe display was followed by a single pattern mask (4.6°) shown for 
495 ms. The participant’s task was to name the probe object as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. Response times at probe were recorded by the computer through a voice key 
attached to a microphone on the table. 
 The computer displayed the names of the attended prime and the probe object, as well 
as the probe response time. At the end of each trial-pair, the experimenter used the keyboard 
to record the participant's accuracy as well as voice key errors (i.e., when the voice key 
triggered erroneously). The participant could then initiate the next trial with a key press. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 In all conditions, priming was calculated as the participant's mean RT at probe in the 
unprimed (baseline) condition minus their mean RT in the corresponding experimental 
condition. Trials on which either the prime or probe responses were incorrect (12.3%) were 
excluded from the statistical analysis, as were voice key errors (3.9%). To verify that 
attention was deployed according to the instructions of each condition, the configuration 
(intact vs. split) of the Unprobed Prime was included as a factor in the analysis. 
 A 2 (Attention: attended vs. ignored) x 2 (Prime Configuration: intact vs. split) x 2 
(Unprobed Prime: intact vs. split) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a 
reliable main effect of Attention, F (1, 41) = 138.77, p < .001, and Prime Configuration, F (1, 
41) = 11.35, p < .002, but the interaction between Attention and Prime Configuration did not 
approach reliability, F (1, 41) < 1 (see Figure 3 and Table 1). There was no main effect of 
Unprobed Prime or any interaction involving that factor (all Fs < 1). Thus, there was no 
indication of attention being deployed differently if both prime images were intact, split or 
one of each. There were no indications of a speed-accuracy trade-off in any condition.   
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 Analysis of each priming condition was carried out to determine which type of prime 
display caused savings in response time for the probe display (i.e., faster naming responses 
relative to unprimed probes). Priming was reliably greater than zero (Bonferoni corrected) in 
the attended-intact, t (41) = 13.85, p < .001; attended-split, t (41) = 9.44, p < .001; and 
ignored-intact conditions, t (41) = 3.36, p < .01, but not in the ignored-split condition, t (41) < 
1.  
                                        {Figure 3 and Table 1 around here} 
 In general, the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with previous research, for both 
positive and negative priming, demonstrating that object recognition can take place in the 
absence of visual attention (e.g., Stankiewicz, et al., 1998; Tipper & Driver, 1988; Treisman 
& DeSchepper, 1996).  As predicted by the hybrid model, split images primed their intact 
counterparts only when they (the split images) were attended but both attended and ignored 
intact images primed their intact counterparts. There was a reliable priming advantage for 
intact primes over split primes which was almost identical in both attended and ignored 
conditions (~50 ms, replicating Stankiewicz et al., 1998). Thus, the effects of attention 
(attended vs. ignored) and configuration (intact vs. split) were strictly additive. These results 
strongly support the hypothesis that two qualitatively different representations of shape 
mediate priming in object recognition: an analytic representation that is relatively robust to 
configural distortions but requires attention, and a holistic representation that is sensitive to 
configural distortion but does not require attention. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 necessarily confounded attention with naming: If and only if the 
participants attended an image did they name it. Therefore, it is at least logically possible that 
all the priming in the attended conditions derived from concept or name priming.  Previous 
research (Biederman and Cooper, 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993; 
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Stankiewicz et al., 1998) has shown that priming from attended images is largely (although 
not completely) visual.  However, this fact does not imply that the priming observed in the 
current paradigm is necessarily visual.  As such, it is necessary to tease apart what fraction of 
the priming observed in the current paradigm is visual, and what fraction non-visual (e.g., 
concept or name priming). 
 Experiment 2 was designed to estimate what fraction of the priming observed in 
Experiment 1 was due to visual (as opposed to concept and/or name) priming. To this end, 
images in the identical-image conditions of Experiment 1 (attended-intact, ignored-intact) 
were replaced with images of objects having the same basic-level name as the corresponding 
probe object, but with a different shape (same-name-different-exemplar [SNDE]; following 
Biederman & Cooper, 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993; Stankiewicz et 
al., 1998). For example, if a grand piano (basic level name “piano”) served as a probe object, 
then Experiment 2 presented an intact image of an upright piano (“piano”) in the SNDE 
prime condition (instead of an identical grand piano), and a split version of the image of the 
grand piano in the split conditions.  The conditions with split images (attended-split, ignored-
split) were identical to those in Experiment 1 in that the split object of the prime display was 
followed by an intact probe object of the same exemplar. If any of the priming observed for 
attended objects in the split condition in Experiment 2 is specifically visual, then we expect 
more priming with split image (grand piano) primes than with SNDE (upright piano) primes. 
By contrast, if all the priming observed with split images in Experiment 1 was simply name 
or concept priming, then the SNDE images should prime as much as (or more than) the split 
images (see Biederman & Cooper, 1991a; Stankiewicz et al., 1998).  
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Method 
Participants 
 Forty-two native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated for credit in introductory psychology courses at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, and at Goldsmiths' College, University of London.  
Materials 
 The experiment used a set of 84 objects in 42 SNDE pairs. Half were taken from the 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set used in Experiment 1, and the corresponding SNDE 
exemplars were line drawings of similar style.  
Procedure 
 The conditions in Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1 except that 
the intact primes were replaced by SNDE primes. Thus, each probe image in the intact 
conditions was paired with an intact probe image of a different object with the same name 
(rather than being paired with itself, as in Experiment 1). As in Experiment 1, all objects 
appeared equally often in each of the seven prime-probe conditions. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Trials in which either the prime or probe were named incorrectly were excluded 
(20.1%), as were voice key errors (3.7%). Figure 4 and Table 2 show the priming results in 
each condition. A 2 (Attention: attended vs. ignored) x 2 (Prime Type: SNDE vs. split image) 
x 2 (Unprobed Prime: intact vs. split) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed a reliable main effect of Attention, F (1, 41) = 34.53, p < .001 and of Prime Type, 
F (1, 41) = 6.10, p <  .02. The interaction between Attention and Prime Type was also 
reliable, F (1, 41) = 10.86, p < .002. Post-hoc Newman-Keuls analysis on the interaction 
revealed that the difference between the attended-SNDE and attended-split conditions was 
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statistically reliable (p < .008), but the difference between the ignored-SNDE and ignored-
split conditions was not (p > .6) There was no main effect of Unprobed Prime and no 
interactions involving that factor (p > .14 for all comparisons). There were no indications of a 
speed-accuracy trade-off.   
 Analysis of each priming condition was carried out to determine which type of prime 
display caused savings in response time for the probe display (i.e., faster naming responses 
relative to unprimed probes). Priming was reliably greater (Bonferoni corrected) than zero in 
the attended-split condition, t (41) = 5.89, p < .001, almost so in the attended-SNDE 
condition, t (41) = 2.27, p < .03 (critical value, p < .0125), but neither in the ignored-SNDE 
condition, t (41) < 1 nor in the ignored-split condition, t (41) < 1. Thus, SNDE and split 
images primed the corresponding probe image when attended, but not when ignored. 
{Figure 4 and Table 2 around here) 
 Experiment 2 showed than an intact probe was primed more by an attended split 
image than by an intact different exemplar of the same basic-level category. The priming 
advantage for attended split objects over attended intact SNDEs was about 80 ms. Since in 
both cases participants responded with the same name in prime and probe trials, this 
difference indicates a strong visual component to the priming in the attended and ignored 
conditions.  Indeed, the lack of any priming for unattended SNDE primes suggests that all the 
priming observed in the unattended condition of Experiment 1 was specifically visual.  
 Experiment 2 found no priming in either of the ignored conditions. It therefore not 
only replicated the lack of priming for ignored split images in Experiment 1 but also 
produced no priming that was reliably greater than zero for SNDE prime images (replicating 
Stankiewicz et al., 1998). These last results are in contrast to the findings of Tipper (1985), 
who showed evidence of negative semantic priming for ignored stimuli (see Stankiewicz et 
al., 1998, for a discussion). 
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Experiment 3 
 Experiments 1 and 2 together demonstrated visual priming for intact and split images 
in the attended conditions, but only intact images were primed in the ignored conditions. This 
pattern of priming is expected on the account that the visual system generates holistic 
representations of ignored images and analytic representations of attended images (Hummel, 
2001; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996a). However, an alternative interpretation of the results 
of Experiments 1 and 2 is that all the observed priming resides in early visual representations 
(i.e., rather than in the representations responsible for object recognition, as assumed by the 
hybrid model), and that identical images simply prime one another more than non-identical 
images, and attended images prime one another more than unattended images.  If this “early 
priming” account is correct, then the advantage for identical images over non-identical 
images and the advantage for attended images over unattended images could conspire to yield 
the effects observed in Experiment 1.  Although this interpretation is challenged by the 
results of Stankiewicz and Hummel (2002), who showed that priming for ignored images is 
invariant with translation and scale - and by the fact that intact and split versions of the same 
image present corresponding features to very different retinal locations and therefore 
probably activate few of the same neurons in early visual processing at V1 and V2 - it cannot 
be ruled out completely based only on the results of Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Experiment 3 was designed to establish whether the results of Experiments 1 and 2 
simply reflect priming in early visual representations or whether they reflect a reliance on 
holistic processing for ignored images, as predicted by the hybrid model.  The logic of 
Experiment 3 is based on an assumption about the locus of the visual priming observed in 
these and other experiments. Priming is a form of learning, leading Cooper, Biederman and 
Hummel (1992) to speculate that one likely locus of visual priming is the point at which 
visual representations of object shape make contact with representations stored in LTM (see 
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Biederman & Cooper, 1991a, for evidence supporting this conjecture). Thus, visual priming - 
including priming of ignored images - must reflect the activation of pre-existing 
representations in LTM.  Indeed, Potter (1976) has shown that failing to attend to a stimulus 
results in a failure to encode it into LTM.  If an image does not have an existing 
representation in LTM, then ignoring that image on one occasion should not prime 
recognition of the very same image on a subsequent occasion. Consistent with this reasoning, 
Stankiewicz (1997) showed that ignoring an upside-down image on one trial does not prime 
recognition of the very same (i.e., upside-down) image on the next trial. 
 Applied to our current paradigm, the logic is as follows: If the results of Experiments 
1 and 2 reflect the role of holistic representations in the recognition of ignored images, and if 
these holistic representations are encoded in LTM in an intact (rather than split) format, then 
ignoring a split image on one occasion should not prime recognition of the very same image 
on a subsequent occasion. However, if the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are due to priming 
early visual features (in both the attended and ignored cases), then ignoring a split image on 
one trial should prime recognition of that image on the subsequent trial.  By contrast, both 
accounts would predict that attending to a split image on one trial should permit the encoding 
and, therefore, priming of that image.   
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-six English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated for 
money or for credit in introductory psychology courses at Goldsmiths' College, University of 
London.  
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Materials 
 The experiment used a set of 84 objects; 36 were used in prime-probe target pairs, the 
rest were fillers for attended and ignored primes. The items were taken from the Snodgrass 
and Vanderwart (1980) set and were similar to those used in Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
 Experiment 3 used the same procedure as Experiment 1 except that (a) half of the 
time, the probe was a split image (recall that in Experiment 1, all probe images were intact), 
and (b) the configuration of the probe image (split or intact) was always the same as the 
configuration (intact or split) of the corresponding prime.  Naturally, this constraint does not 
apply to unprimed baseline images, which have no corresponding prime. Unprobed items for 
prime trials were always intact images, except for the unprimed-split (baseline) condition.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Trials in which either the prime or probe were named incorrectly were excluded 
(15.7%), together with voice key errors (4.9%). Priming was calculated in the same way as in 
Experiment 1 except that two different baseline conditions (unprimed-split and unprimed-
intact) were used to calculate the corresponding priming for split and for intact conditions. 
Figure 5 and Table 3 depicts the amount of priming observed in each condition. A 2 
(Attention: attended vs. ignored) x 2 (Configuration: intact vs. split) within-subjects analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) revealed a reliable main effect of Attention, F (1, 35) = 119.42, 
p < .001, but not Configuration, F (1, 35) < 1. However, the interaction between Attention 
and Configuration was reliable, F (1, 35) = 12.54, p < 0.01. A Newman-Keuls post-hoc 
analysis of the interaction revealed a reliable difference between the ignored-intact and 
ignored-split conditions, p  < .002, but not between the attended-intact and attended-split 
conditions, p > .17. 
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 Analysis of each priming condition was carried out to determine which type of prime 
display caused savings in response time for the probe display (i.e., faster naming responses 
relative to unprimed probes). Priming was reliably greater than zero (Bonferoni corrected) in 
the attended-intact, t (35) = 7.67, p < .001; attended-split, t (35) = 11.93, p < .001; and 
ignored-intact conditions, t (35) = 2.81, p < .01, but was not reliably greater than zero in the 
ignored-split condition, t (35) < 1. 1  
Inspection of Figure 5 shows that the pattern of priming for attended conditions 
differs somewhat from those of Experiments 1 and 2. When attended, a split image primed 
itself just as much as an intact image primed itself. At first blush, this result seems surprising, 
especially given the failure of ignored split images to prime themselves at all. However, there 
were both more errors and longer latencies for split images, suggesting that split images are 
simply harder to recognize (see Table 3), making it likely that they profit more from priming 
than do intact images (see, e.g., Potter, 1976; Rensink, 2000).  
As Experiment 3 differed from Experiments 1 and 2 in the use of different baselines 
we also carried out analyses of the raw probe latencies. A 3 (Prime Type: attended, ignored, 
unprimed) by 2 (Configuration: intact vs. split) ANOVA on probe latencies revealed a main 
effect of Prime Type, F (2, 70) = 94.71, p < .001, a main effect of Configuration, F (1, 35) = 
29.83, p < .001, and a significant interaction, F (2, 70) = 5.54, p < .01. A Newman-Keuls 
post-hoc analysis of the interaction revealed no difference between latencies for split images 
compared to intact images in the attended conditions (p > .11) but reliable differences in the 
ignored conditions (p < .001) and unprimed conditions (p < .01). Thus, the pattern of results 
in Figure 5 is not simply due to baseline differences in the recognition of split images.  
 
A 3 (Primetype: attended, ignored, unprimed) by 2 (Configuration: intact vs. split) 
ANOVA on error rates (excluding voice key errors) revealed only a main effect of 
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Configuration, F (1, 35) = 12.87, p < .01 with error rates for split images higher than for 
intact images. Thus, there is no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off in any condition. 
 
{Figure 5 and Table 3 about here} 
As predicted by the hybrid model - but not by the early visual priming hypothesis -
Experiment 3 showed that split images primed themselves when they were attended but not 
when they were ignored, whereas intact images primed themselves whether they were 
attended or not.  In addition, in the attended conditions, split images primed themselves just 
as much as intact images. Experiment 3 thus demonstrated that the lack of priming for 
ignored split images in Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to a general decrease of priming in 
response to split images and, more generally, that the priming pattern observed in Experiment 
1 cannot be explained by a simple "more priming for identical images" (low-level visual) 
account.  
General Discussion 
The results of three experiments strongly support the central theoretical tenet of the 
hybrid model of object recognition (Hummel, 2001; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996), that 
object recognition is based on a hybrid analytic+holistic representation of object shape.  In 
Experiment 1, attended intact, attended split and ignored intact images primed subsequent 
recognition of corresponding intact images, whereas ignored split images did not prime their 
intact counterparts.  This pattern of effects is predicted by the hybrid account because 
attended images are represented both analytically and holistically, whereas ignored images 
are represented only holistically. Since a holistic representation of a split image has little or 
nothing in common with a holistic representation of its intact counterpart, ignoring a split 
image (and thereby representing it only holistically) is not expected to prime its intact 
counterpart.  Ignoring an intact image, by contrast, is expected to prime its intact counterpart.  
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Priming is expected for an analytic representation of a split image because it has a great deal 
in common with an analytic representation of its intact counterpart; thus, attending to a split 
image is expected to prime its intact counterpart.   
Experiment 1 also revealed another important aspect of the hybrid account. Since an 
attended image is expected to be represented both analytically and holistically, attending to 
an intact image (thereby priming both the analytic and holistic representations) is expected to 
prime that image more than attending to its split counterpart (which is expected to prime the 
analytic representation only). The advantage for an intact prime (relative to a split prime) was 
exactly the same (~50 ms) in both the attended and ignored conditions. This additive effect of 
configuration with attention (like the additive effects of view [identical vs. reflected] and 
attention observed by Stankiewicz et al., 1998) suggests that the analytic and holistic 
representations are processed in parallel and make independent contact with object memory 
(see also Stankiewicz et al., 1998). 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that a substantial fraction (at least 80 ms) of the observed 
priming for attended objects was specifically visual (rather than simply name or concept 
priming). Experiment 3 showed that ignored split images did not prime even themselves but, 
when attended, split images primed themselves at least as much as intact images primed 
themselves.  These results indicate that the results of Experiments 1 and 2 reflect visual 
priming at the interface of shape perception and object memory, and cannot be accounted for 
simply in terms of “more priming for identical images, and more priming for attended 
images”.  Together, the results of Experiments 1 - 3 strongly suggest that, as predicted by the 
hybrid model, the visual system represents attended images both analytically and holistically, 
and represents ignored images only holistically.  
One of the most striking aspects of the findings presented here is that the results of 
Experiment 1 (Figure 3) are nearly an exact numerical replication of the findings of 
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Stankiewicz et al. (1998, Experiment 1) who used left-right reflections rather than split 
images.  In both studies, identical images enjoyed a priming advantage of approximately 50 
ms over non-identical (i.e., split or reflected) images in both the attended and ignored 
conditions. The fact that configural distortions (splitting an image) and left-right reflection 
have such similar effects on attended and unattended images suggests that similar 
mechanisms are at work in both cases (as predicted by the hybrid model).  Namely, attention 
permits the visual system to generate an analytic representation robust to both configural 
distortions and left-right reflection, whereas in the absence of attention, it must rely on 
holistic representations that are robust to neither of these manipulations. 
The findings reported here are inconsistent with the majority of models of object 
recognition currently in the literature.  View-based models (e.g., Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995; 
Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Ullman & Basri, 1991) and their relatives (e.g., Edelman & 
Intrator, 2000, 2003; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999) are based strictly on varieties of holistic 
coding and cannot account for the fact that a split image can visually prime its intact 
counterpart.  More generally, these models are inconsistent with the role of relations in shape 
perception (Hummel, 2000; Hummel & Biederman, 1992) and with the capacity of the 
human visual system to represent aspects of object shape independently of one another (i.e., 
non-holistically; Stankiewicz, 2002).  Pure structural description theories (e.g., Biederman, 
1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Marr & Nishihara, 1978), as well as feature-listing 
theories (Mel, 1997; Mel & Fiser, 2000) provide a natural account of the fact that split images 
can visually prime their intact counterparts, but these models fail to account for the role of 
visual attention in this capacity.  Feature-based models, in particular, predict that visual 
priming should persist over many kinds of configural distortions (including random 
“scrambling” of an object’s features about the image; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Mel, 
1997), regardless of whether the distorted image is attended or ignored.  Accounting both for 
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the fact that split images can prime their intact counterparts and for the fact that this priming 
depends on visual attention requires a hybrid account in which attention is required to 
generate a splitting-robust representation of shape. Hybrid accounts based on fragments 
derived from learned views (e.g. Edelman & Intrator, 2002; 2003) do not predict visual 
priming from split images to their intact counterparts because the proposed fragments are tied 
to specific locations in the image. Moreover, fragment theory predicts that multiple fixations 
are needed during initial encoding in order to establish the various location-dependent object 
fragments (Edelman & Intrator, 2003). In our experiments split images primed subsequent 
intact probe images even though their presentation duration was too short to permit saccades.  
The findings presented here have additional important implications for theories of 
object recognition in general and for the hybrid model in particular. For the hybrid model, the 
findings strongly suggest that the analytic and holistic representations work in parallel rather 
than in a serial manner.  It is not simply a matter of "early" priming for ignored images and 
"early and late" priming for attended images.  A serial model of this kind could, in principle, 
account for the results of our Experiments 1 and 2, and for the effects reported by 
Stankiewicz et al. (1998), who showed that a change in viewpoint (left-right reflection) was 
associated with a reduction in priming for both attended and ignored objects. However, such 
an account cannot explain the priming effects observed in Experiment 3, in which split 
images did not even prime themselves when ignored.  
The findings also have implications for the breakdown of object recognition with 
brain damage.  Davidoff and Warrington (1999, 2001) reported case studies of patients who 
were extremely poor at recognizing object parts or "exploded" objects, even though they 
could name intact objects (in familiar views). In terms of the hybrid model, it would seem 
that their holistic route is unimpaired, allowing them to recognize objects presented in intact 
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familiar views, whereas their analytic route seemed to be impaired, as recognition of parts 
was poor.    
In conclusion, the experiments reported here demonstrated that the visual 
representation generated in response to an attended image is qualitatively different from that 
generated in response to an ignored image. Although recognition takes place in both cases, it 
is mediated by an analytic representation when the image is attended and by a holistic 
representation when the image is ignored. These findings suggest a very specific answer to 
the question “How can the visual representation of shape have some properties that demand 
explanation in terms of analytic representations, and simultaneously have other properties 
that are strictly inconsistent with analytic representations?” It appears that the visual system 
represents shape analytically when it can, but represents it holistically when it must.  
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            Footnote 
 
1. The size difference between the cueing square and the object was .5 degrees of 
visual angle. A reviewer suggested that this may be a small enough separation to 
allow completion of the split images. Thus, the difference between attended and 
ignored split image conditions could have arisen from there being completion only in 
the former case. While there are several reasons for discounting completion as an 
explanation of the pattern of results in Experiments 1- 3, the most straightforward way 
was to assess the effect of a larger separation between the cueing square and image.  
In a replication, 36 participants took part in an identical experiment to Experiment 3 
except that the size difference between cueing square and image was now 1 degree of 
visual angle. The statistical pattern of results was very similar; the only two reliable 
effects were for Attention (F (1,35) = 84.44, p < .001) and for the interaction between 
Attention and Configuration (F (1,35) = 10.47, p < .01). Thus, there was reliable 
priming in all conditions (attended intact 160.6 ms, attended-ignored 204.3 ms; 
ignored-intact 49.9 ms) except for the ignored-split condition (16.8 ms). 
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Table 1: Mean response times (ms) and percentage errors for conditions in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Attended-
Intact 
Attended 
Split 
Ignored 
Intact 
Ignored  
Split 
Unprimed 
M 595 649 762 816 813 
SE 19 15 15 19 17 
% errors 7 15 11 13 14 
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Table 2: Mean response times (ms) and percentage errors for conditions in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Attended 
SNDE 
Attended 
Split 
Ignored 
SNDE 
Ignored  
Split 
Unprimed 
M 689 615 735 748 749 
SE 22 19 24 25 16 
% errors 18 24 22 14 22 
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Table 3: Mean response times (ms) and percentage errors for conditions in Experiment 3. 
 
 
 Attended 
Intact 
Attended 
Split 
Ignored 
Intact 
Ignored 
Split 
Unprimed 
Intact 
Unprimed 
Split 
M 630 662 768 890 830 887 
SE 16 18 19 27 25 24 
 
% errors 8 20 17 17 12 20 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Examples of intact and split images used in Experiments 1 - 3.  
Figure 2. Sequence of displays in Experiment 1. 
Figure 3. Priming (baseline RT minus RT in each experimental condition) means and 
standard errors for Experiment 1 as a function of whether the prime image was (a) attended or 
ignored and (b) intact or split (n = 42). 
Figure 4. Priming means and standard errors for Experiment 2 as a function of whether the 
prime object was attended or ignored and whether it was a same-name-different exemplar 
(SNDE) image or as a split image (n = 42). 
Figure 5. Priming means and standard errors for Experiment 3 as a function of whether the 
prime object was attended or ignored and whether both prime and probe were split or intact 
(n = 36). 
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